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Abstract 
It is widely agreed that there is a crisis in labour/employment standards enforcement. A key issue 
is the role of deterrence measures that penalise violations. Employment standards enforcement in 
Ontario, like in most jurisdictions, is based mainly on a compliance framework promoting 
voluntary resolution of complaints and, if that fails, ordering restitution. Deterrence measures that 
penalise violations are rarely invoked. However, the Ontario government has recently increased 
the role of proactive inspections and tickets, a low-level deterrence measure which imposes fines 
of $295 plus victim surcharges. In examining the effectiveness of the use of tickets in inspections, 
we begin by looking at this development in the broader context of employment standards 
enforcement and its historical trajectory. Then, using administrative data from the Ministry of 
Labour, we examine when and why tickets are issued in the course of workplace inspections. After 
demonstrating that even when ticketable violations are detected, tickets are issued only rarely, we 
explore factors associated with an increased likelihood of an inspector issuing a ticket. Finally, we 
2 
 
consider how the overall deterrent effect of workplace inspections is influenced by the use or non-
use of deterrence tools. 
JEL codes: J88 
Keywords 
Canada, compliance, deterrence, employment standards, labour standards, Ontario, tickets, 
violations 
I. Introduction 
While we often hear about struggles to raise the minimum wage and other labour standards, the 
issue of their enforcement receives far less attention. Yet without effective enforcement, improved 
labour standards will fail to achieve their objective. While this observation is not novel (eg, Burns 
1926: 146-47), researchers repeatedly find that labour standards enforcement fails to make 
workers’ rights real. A recent United States investigation concluded that ‘[w]age laws are poorly 
enforced, with workers often unable to recover back pay even after government rules in their favor’ 
(Levine, 2018). Dickens (2012: 206-07) found that ‘enforcement in Britain is flawed in that too 
much reliance is placed on individuals having to assert and pursue their statutory employment 
rights, which generally require only passive compliance from employers …’. In Australia, Hardy 
(2016: 107) concludes that ‘[t]he compliance and enforcement problems which have been brought 
to light in the past year are complex, challenging and profound’. 
While there is no simple answer to the question of how to strengthen labour standards 
enforcement, deterrence is generally agreed to play an important role. Yet many studies find that 
employers are rarely penalised for violating their workers’ rights. In the province of Ontario, 
Canada, employment standards (ES) enforcement has focused principally on encouraging 
voluntary compliance and, if that fails, ordering restitution. Deterrence measures that penalise 
violations are rarely invoked. This approach to the enforcement of protective employment laws 
has a long history (Tucker, 1990) and many worker advocates and academic researchers have 
argued that it results in regulatory failure (Bernstein et al., 2003). 
The limited role of deterrence measures in Canada is not unique to Ontario. For example, 
Gesualdi-Fecteau and Vallée (2016) have found little use of penal provisions in Quebec, while 
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researchers in British Columbia (BC) report that proactive enforcement has been abandoned and 
that enforcement staff has been reduced by half since 2000/2001 despite a 25% increase in 
establishments with employees (BC Employment Standards Coalition, 2017). 
In this article, we scrutinise the use of tickets in ES enforcement in Ontario. Tickets are a low-
level deterrence measure made available to Employment Standards Officers (ESOs) in 2004 when 
the government amended regulations under the Provincial Offences Act (POA) to make 58 
violations of the Employment Standards Act (ESA) ticketable and subject to fines of $295 plus 
victim surcharges. In particular, we focus on the use of tickets in the context of workplace 
inspections, which is one of two ways in which ESA violations may come to the attention of ESOs, 
the other way being via individual complaints. 
Most enforcement resources in Ontario are dedicated to addressing individual workers' 
complaints that their employers have violated their rights. Indeed, this is the principal way in which 
violations are detected and resolved. Nevertheless, in response to widespread criticism of the 
limitations of a complaints-based enforcement model, in recent years the Ontario government 
increased the role of proactive workplace inspections and introduced a program of targeted 
inspections, known as blitzes. This initiative represents a limited but potentially meaningful 
change in the government’s overall approach to ES enforcement and, therefore, merits scrutiny in 
order to assess how deterrence measures are used in this particular context. 
The analysis begins with a brief discussion of the role of deterrence in ES enforcement and 
the deterrence measures available under the ESA. It then turns to a detailed empirical examination 
of the use of tickets in workplace inspections, including the prevalence of tickets, the types of 
violations that result in tickets, and when and why tickets are used, with a focus on workplaces 
that have been inspected more than once. We conclude with a discussion of the overall use of 
tickets in ES enforcement, looking at both the pattern of practice in Ontario and broader questions 
about the use of low-level deterrence measures in regulatory enforcement systems. 
II. Deterrence in ES enforcement 
Approaches to regulatory enforcement are either compliance-focused or deterrence-focused. 
Compliance-focused approaches prioritise the role of the state in assisting duty holders to meet 
their legal obligations through education about what those obligations are and how best to meet 
them. The assumption is that most employers want to comply with the law and that violations are 
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largely the result of ignorance or incompetence. Therefore, the most productive approach to 
securing compliance is for ESOs to win the trust of employers by demonstrating a non-punitive 
approach, gently guiding employers onto the right path while ensuring that employees who have 
been deprived of their statutory entitlements get restitution. In contrast, deterrence-focused 
approaches, assume that much, if not most, wrongdoing is based on a calculation of the costs of 
compliance relative to the risks of non-compliance. If duty holders believe that there is little risk 
of violations being detected or that if they are detected the severity of punishment is low, then they 
will more likely to violate the law. Therefore, effective enforcement requires the state to change 
that calculation by increasing the risk of detection and/or the severity of punishment. Such an 
approach will specifically deter individuals and will also produce general deterrence as knowledge 
of the government’s approach to enforcement becomes widespread. 
Recently, regulators and researchers have recognised that effective enforcement requires a 
combination of compliance and deterrence. One such model is responsive regulation (Ayres and 
Braithewaite, 1992) which posits that regulators should initially approach duty holders as well-
intentioned and provide compliance assistance, resorting to deterrence measures of increasing 
severity only if compliance or low-level deterrence measures fail. This set of assumptions yields 
the well-known enforcement pyramid. Although it is expected that deterrence measures will not 
be needed in most cases, it is vital that they are available and used when necessary. A second, 
more recent approach is the strategic enforcement model developed by Weil (2008, 2010, 2014). 
Weil looks at the contextual factors that increase the likelihood of employer ES violations, 
including the fissuring of employer responsibility that results in shifting work out of large firms 
and into environments subject to intense competitive pressures. Strategic enforcement aims to 
respond to this environment by building on four principles: prioritisation, deterrence, 
sustainability, and systemic effects. Clearly, deterrence plays a larger role in strategic enforcement 
than in responsive regulation, but in both scenarios, it remains only one element of a broader 
regulatory approach in which compliance strategies play a role, including working with lead firms 
to secure their cooperation in achieving compliance by their franchisees, contractors, or suppliers. 
Despite the differences between these models, they both situate deterrence as an essential 
element of an effective regulatory enforcement strategy. Yet in Ontario relatively few ES 
violations result in the use of a low-level deterrence measure by an ESO, and higher-level 
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deterrence measures appear to be used only when employers defy the authority of the state by 
refusing to comply with an order to pay or interfere with an ESO. 
Notwithstanding this general finding, it is important to consider how deterrence operates in 
particular components of the enforcement process. As noted, ES enforcement in Ontario is largely 
complaint-based. Three-quarters of all violations are detected through complaints and much of the 
Ministry of Labour's (MOL’s) Employment Standards Program staff and resources are devoted to 
complaint resolution. Nevertheless, the role of proactive inspections grew steadily after the 
province’s Auditor General drew attention to the virtual disappearance of workplace inspections 
in 2004. In more recent years, the MOL has adopted a targeted inspection strategy that seeks to 
prioritise sectors of the economy or the workforce where it believes that ES violations are more 
frequent. In light of this shift, a study of the use of deterrence measures and tickets in particular 
during inspections is warranted. 
Before turning to the empirical dimension of the investigation, it is helpful to examine the 
deterrence tools available in ES enforcement in Ontario. Rather than begin with low-level 
deterrence tools, for historical reasons we start by describing the most severe deterrence tool, the 
criminal law. The architecture of the Canadian constitution draws a very sharp distinction between 
criminal and regulatory law. This distinction flows from the fact that criminal law is a matter of 
exclusive federal jurisdiction and so provinces cannot create criminal penalties for the violation of 
provincial statutes. Employment regulation is considered a matter of property and civil rights and 
therefore is principally a provincial responsibility; as a result, violations of the ESA cannot be 
made crimes by the province. However, the federal government may choose to treat some 
employer misconduct that also involves breaches of provincial statutes as crimes, especially where 
there is an element of intentional behaviour. Thus, in 1935, the federal government criminalised 
the intentional violation of minimum wage laws, a provision that remained on the books until 1954, 
although for a variety of reasons it was unenforceable (Tucker, 2017). 
Provincial laws normally make their violation a regulatory offence.  For example, the ESA 
makes it an offence to contravene the Act or its regulations, or to fail to comply with an order or 
direction issued by an ESO (s. 132). Regulatory offences are strict liability offences in that there 
is no need to prove intent, only that the law was violated.  Individuals are liable to be fined up to 
$50,000 or imprisoned for up to 12 months. Corporations are liable to be fined up to $100,000 for 
a first offence, $250,000 for a second offence, and $500,000 for a third or subsequent offence. 
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There are also provisions allowing directors and officers of corporations to be prosecuted and 
punished under certain circumstances (ss.136, 137). Prosecutions of this kind are initiated by a 
formal charge known as an ‘information’ and the procedures to be followed are governed by Part 
III of the POA. 
For many years, Part III prosecutions were the only deterrence tool available to enforce the 
ESA, yet they were rarely initiated. In addition to the general aversion of enforcement officials to 
act like police (Hawkins, 1984; Kagan, 1984), Part III prosecutions are time-consuming. ESOs can 
only recommend prosecutions; the ultimate decision is made by the Legal Services Branch (LSB) 
of the MOL, acting as Crown. This cumbersome process led regulators to develop lower-level 
deterrence tools that could be applied with greater ease. In 2000, the government amended the 
ESA to give ESOs the power to issue a Notice of Compliance (NOC). Section 113 of the ESA 
provides: “If an employment standards officer believes that a person has contravened a provision 
of this Act, the officer may issue a notice to the person setting out the officer’s belief and the 
prescribed penalty for that contravention.” Crucially, NOCs may be issued for any contravention 
of the Act and so are widely available. Ontario Regulation 289/01 sets out the prescribed penalties: 
at the time of writing, $250 for a first contravention, $500 for a second contravention, and $1,000 
for a third or subsequent contravention. NOCs can be served in a variety of ways, including mail, 
fax, and email (s. 95). An entity served with a NOC is deemed to be guilty and liable to pay the 
penalty unless they apply to the Ontario Labour Relations Board for a review within 30 days. 
NOCs are best conceptualised as an administrative penalty, rather than a regulatory offence, since 
they are not governed by the POA and the judiciary is not involved at any stage. 
The second low-level compliance tool, tickets, was created in 2004 by an amendment to 
Regulation 950 (O.Reg. 162/04) of the POA, and aimed ostensibly to protect vulnerable employees 
in instances of relatively minor offences (Ontario Ministry of Labour, 2004). Violations of specific 
statutes can be prosecuted by a ‘certificate of offence’ or ticket, under Part I of the POA, a simpler 
procedure than a Part III prosecution. Importantly, tickets can be issued by ESOs – who are 
provincial offence officers – but, unlike NOCs, they must be served personally on the accused. 
ESOs do not need to involve the ESB in the decision to issue a ticket, although the LSB may 
become involved if the accused contests a ticket. There are currently a total of 58 ticketable ESA 
violations that can be categorised into three main groupings: administrative violations (such as 
record keeping), monetary violations (failure to pay wages or failure to pay vacation pay), and 
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non-monetary substantive violations (hours of work exceeds limit). The amount of the fine is set 
by the Chief Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice and currently is $295. As well, a victim fine 
surcharge and an administrative fee are added to each fine (O.Reg. 161/00) so that the total payable 
for each ticket is $360.  
Theoretically, a NOC could be issued for each ticketable violation. However, the MOL 
Administrative Manual for Employment Standards (AMES) (2017, S. 7.5.7) stipulates that ESOs 
should issue tickets rather than NOCs, and this is the practice of ESOs (Vosko, Noack and Tucker, 
2016). In fact, NOCs are used quite infrequently in the context of workplace inspections (Table 
1), and for that reason we focus on the use of tickets. 
The AMES (S. 7A.2) also states that the objective of prosecution policy for both Part I tickets 
and Part III prosecutions is to ensure compliance with minimum standards set out in the ESA. It 
further states that the purpose of prosecution is both specific and general deterrence and that the 
decision to prosecute should be based on a number of considerations once it has been determined 
there is sufficient evidence to establish the offence. These considerations include: the seriousness 
or gravity of the offence, the history of compliance, mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the 
availability of effective alternatives to prosecution, program identification of targeted 
contraventions, and the necessity of maintaining public confidence in the legislation. The manual 
elaborates on these considerations (S. 7A.3) and then advises ESOs generally to use tickets for 
first offenders of less serious offences (S. 7A.4.1). 
III. The use of tickets in workplace inspections 
A. Methods 
In examining the use of tickets in workplace inspections, we draw on the Ontario MOL's 
Employment Standards Information System (ESIS), a repository of data on Ontario’s ES 
enforcement that is not otherwise publically available.1 As ESIS was designed for administrative 
purposes, such as tracking and record-keeping, rather than for research purposes, it has not 
undergone the same quality control and data verification process as survey data from large 
statistical agencies. However, as a complete record of workplace inspections conducted under the 
ESA, ESIS data provide key insights into ESA enforcement unavailable from any other source. 
Our focus is on workplace inspections completed from 2012/13 to 2015/16, the most recent fiscal2 
years for which near-complete data are available. Since we rely on the fiscal year in which an 
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inspection was conducted, these findings may differ from reports issued by the MOL, which 
typically report tickets using their conviction date. 
B. The scope and types of inspections 
Workplace inspections in Ontario focus primarily on 11 standards, which are stipulated in the 
AMES (Ch. 4, 3): 
 Poster requirements 
 Wage statements 
 Unauthorized deductions 
 Record keeping 
 Hours of work 
 Eating periods 
 Overtime pay 
 Minimum wage 
 Public holidays 
 Vacation with pay 
 Temporary help agencies charging employees fees and providing information. 
A full inspection will cover all 11 standards, but sometimes inspections will be limited to a sub-
set of them. Other times, albeit rarely, standards outside this list, such as unpaid wages, will also 
be assessed. 
Inspections can be divided conceptually into three main types. The first type are expanded 
investigations launched when an ESO detects a violation from an individual complaint that is 
included in the 11 standards that are investigated during an inspection and has reason to believe 
other employees are affected similarly. Expanded investigations bridge the reactive/proactive 
divide insofar as they are initiated by a complaint, but become proactive by seeking to discover 
whether non-complaining employees suffered the same violation. The other two types of 
inspections, blitz and regular inspections, are purely proactive insofar as they are undertaken as 
part of a planned program of inspections. Targeted or blitz inspections are initiated by the MOL to 
investigate a particular sector in which it suspects a high incidence of ES violations. For example, 
the MOL conducted blitz inspections of Temporary Help Agencies in 2012 and 2015 and of nail 
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salons and fast-food restaurants in the context of the vulnerable workers blitz in 2013. Regular 
inspections are more random. ESOs select employers for inspection based on regional priorities or 
individual discretion.3  
C. The prevalence of tickets in inspections 
Two different measures are useful when examining the prevalence of tickets in workplace 
inspections. The first considers the number of tickets in relation to the total number of ticketable 
violations detected and recorded in an inspection. The second considers the number of tickets in 
relation to the number of inspections that detected and recorded a ticketable violation.4 Both 
measures are important to consider because, as we note below, researchers have investigated the 
impact of an inspection with a single deterrent measure that is independent of the total number of 
violations detected. 
Table 1 provides data on the use of tickets and NOCs both in workplace inspections and for 
individual complaints, relative to the number of violations that could be ticketed or subject to a 
NOC. Foremost, the table shows that ESOs adhere to the MOL’s policy of favouring tickets over 
NOCs, regardless of whether a violation is detected in an inspection or in a complaint. NOCs and 
tickets are both used far less frequently in complaints; however, for both complaints and 
inspections, NOCs are used typically for less than 1% of all violations. Whereas tickets are used 
slightly more often, they are issued far more frequently for ticketable violations detected in 
workplace inspections than for those detected in complaints. Reasons for this difference include 
the possibility that in the context of complaints ESOs are more focused on dispute resolution than 
on deterrence. However, the fact that tickets are used much more frequently in the context of 
inspections than in the context of complaints supports our decision to investigate deterrence 
practices in workplace inspections separate from complaints. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE  
 
In 2012/13, 6% of ticketable violations detected in workplace inspections resulted in tickets, 
whereas in the three subsequent years for which data are available, this percentage rose to roughly 
9%. Table 2 presents data on the prevalence of tickets using the number of inspections as the 
denominator. It thereby considers the practice of ticketing in relation to the number of inspections 
with ticketable violations and presents a very different picture; by this measure, the prevalence of 
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ticketing more than doubles, ranging between 16% and 22%, although the prevalence of ticketing 
in 2012/13 is anomalously low compared to subsequent years. The percentage of inspections with 
tickets is greater than the percentage of ticketed violations because an ESO may find multiple 
ticketable violations on an inspection but can choose to only issue tickets for a select number, a 
practice discussed below. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
D. Types of violations resulting in tickets 
Although tickets are more commonly issued in the context of workplace inspections than 
individual complaints, little is known about which types of violations prompt an ESO to issue a 
ticket. At the most general level, we can compare violations of monetary and non-monetary 
standards under the ESA. As Figure 1 illustrates, ESOs are more likely to issue tickets for monetary 
violations of ES, compared to non-monetary violations. Whereas between 2013/14 to 2015/16 
almost a quarter of monetary violations received tickets, during the same period consistently less 
than 5% of non-monetary violations were ticketed. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE  
 
To better understand how tickets are used in ES enforcement, it is useful to consider ticketing 
practices in relation to specific ES violations.  Figure 2, which presents data pooled across fiscal 
years 2012/13 to 2015/16, depicts the use of tickets for the following ES monetary violations: 
overtime pay, minimum wage, public holiday pay,  vacation pay, and unpaid wages (the latter 
violation is not mandated for inspections but is nevertheless assessed occasionally). It also depicts 
the use of tickets for the following non-monetary ES violations: record keeping, wage statements, 
poster/postering, and excess daily or weekly hours of work. 
In terms of absolute numbers, tickets are most commonly issued for overtime pay violations 
(306 tickets), public holiday pay violations (454 tickets), and record keeping violations (125 
tickets) (Figure 2). Among monetary ES violations, tickets are most prevalent when there are 
violations of minimum wages (31% of detected violations). Tickets for violations of overtime pay 
are the second most prevalent (27% of detected violations). Finally, ESOs ticket detected unpaid 
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wage violations 21% of the time, and detected holiday pay violations 17% of the time, both less 
often than might be expected.5 
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
  
Overall, ESOs are less likely to ticket non-monetary violations of all sorts than monetary 
violations. Among non-monetary violations, tickets for record keeping are most common; still, 
only 6% of record keeping violations are ticketed. While it is readily understandable why monetary 
violations are more frequently ticketed than non-monetary violations, the reasons for differences 
in ticketing between the various non-monetary violations are less obvious. 
We can also consider how ticketing practices are influenced by multiple employment 
standards violations and by the amount of the entitlement associated with violating a monetary ES. 
On average, workplace inspections with a higher number of violations are more likely to receive 
a ticket. In inspections where tickets are issued, the average number of monetary violations 
detected is twice as large as the average number of monetary violations detected in inspections 
where no ticket is issued. Additonally, as Table 3 shows, inspections that detect both monetary 
and non-monetary violations are more likely to be ticketed (32%) than those where only monetary 
violations are detected (22%) or those where only non-monetary violations are detected (7%). 
While it is not surprising that tickets are issued less frequently where only non-monetary violations 
are detected, we did not expect that multiple monetary violations would be less likely to result in 
a ticket than a combination of monetary and non-monetary violations. One possible explanation is 
that inspectors perceive that the combination of poor record keeping and monetary violations 
creates a high risk of future violations that a ticket might deter. 
Not suprisingly, workplace inspections that detected the need for greater restitution for 
employees, in terms of the dollar amount of unpaid entitlements, are also more likely to result in a 
ticket. In workplace inspections where a ticket is issued, the median entitlement amount is $1,576; 
in contrast, in workplace inspections where a ticket is not issued this amount was only $591. Such 
findings suggest that, consistent with deterrence theory, the greater the number and size of 
confirmed monetary violations, the higher the likelihood of receiving a ticket. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE  
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E. The use of tickets and employer's industry and size 
In general, there appears to be little relationship between an ESO’s decision to issue a ticket and 
either the industry or company size of the workplace concerned (Table 3). An exception is the 
accommodation and food services industry, where employers are seemingly ticketed more 
frequently than in the other listed industries. A strategic enforcement approach (Weil, 2008) 
suggests that greater use of deterrence measures is required in industries that have a higher 
incidence of violations; the finding may thereby indicate that this approach is having some 
influence on ticketing practices in Ontario. However, the fact that small employers are more 
frequent ES violators (Vosko, Noack and Tucker, 2016: 111) but are not more frequently ticketed 
suggests that the strategic enforcement model is making only limited inroads. 
F. The use of tickets and inspection characteristics  
We have indicated that inspections can be divided conceptually into three main types: expanded 
investigations, targeted or blitz inspections and regular inspections. Here we consider the use of 
tickets in each of these types of inspection. Table 3 shows that almost 25% of expanded 
investigations resulted in a ticket compared to 17% for targeted inspections and 18% for regular 
inspections. One reason for this discrepancy may be that expanded inspections find monetary 
violations more frequently than other types of inspections and thus arguably represent a critical 
tool for bridging the reactive and proactive elements of the province’s ES enforcement regime 
(Vosko, Noack and Tucker, 2016: 7, 107).  
Tickets are also more common when an ESO has to make multiple visits during the inspection. 
Only 7% of inspections where no field visit or only one field visit occurred prompted a ticket. In 
comparison, half of the inspections where five or more field visits occurred prompted a ticket.   
Without more information about the reasons why some inspections require multiple field visits, 
explanations for the increased likelihood of a ticket being issued are necessarily speculative, but 
to the extent that more field visits are required because non-cooperation or poor record-keeping 
make it more difficult for ESOs to perform their work, ESOs may view such visits as reasons to 
signal their displeasure by issuing a ticket. 
When we examine the incidence of ticketing with respect to audits, described earlier, not 
surprisingly we find that tickets are issued more frequently for employers who are required to 
conduct a self audit (27%) or who undergo a full audit (25%) than for employers who are subject 
13 
 
to a test audit (11%).  This is because self audits are only ordered when test audits find 
contraventions and full audits are only required when the employer does not complete the test audit 
(AMES S. 4.7.5). The use of self-audits and full-audits are likely to indicate that an employer has 
more extensive ES violations, which may also explain why they are more likely to result in tickets. 
G. The use of tickets in re-inspections 
A key question centres on whether or not tickets are more commonly issued in instances of repeat 
violations on a re-inspection. Both strategic enforcement and responsive regulation approaches 
emphasize the escalation of deterrence measures for repeat violators. The AMES (S. 4.3, 4.4) states 
that re-inspections should take place either as part of the Ministry’s program to monitor levels of 
compliance or as part of the ESO’s performance plan, which establishes a set number of re-
inspections in a fiscal year. In the latter context, ESOs exercise discretion in selecting employers 
for re-inspection, but are advised to strongly consider employers to whom the officer previously 
issued an order to pay wages or fees in the course of a previous inspection or, if the officer found 
more than one monetary contravention, whether or not any enforcement action was taken. Re-
inspections should occur at least six months, but no later than twelve months, after the conclusion 
of the initial inspection. Employers are warned in advance that they will be re-inspected and, 
indeed, the AMES (S. 4.4) directs ESOs to advise all employers that they may be subject to a re-
inspection. Although AMES provides advice about the scope of the re-inspection (normally 
focusing on the standards found previously to have been violated), nothing is said about the 
appropriate enforcement action if a repeat violation is detected. 
The AMES (S. 4.4) also states that, to ensure continuing compliance with the ESA, 10% of 
employers are to be re-inspected per fiscal year, although the evidence from Figure 3 indicates that 
the MOL does not give high priority to re-inspections; the vast majority of employers (93%) were 
inspected only once from 2012/13 to 2015/16.6 Among those employers inspected only once, 66% 
were found to have committed at least one ticketable violation, and ESOs issued tickets in 18% of 
those inspections. In comparision, among employers inspected more than once, ESOs detected 
ticketable violations 83% of the time on first inspection, and a ticket was issued in 27% of those 
inspections. This result is consistent with the AMES recommendation that ESOs should select 
firms for re-inspection that were previously issued an order to pay or that had more than one 
monetary violation, regardless of whether previous enforcement action was taken. The fact that an 
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ESO detected a monetary violation or issued a ticket on the first inspection increases the likelihood 
of that employer being selected for a re-inspection. Employers who were inspected more than once 
also tended to have higher employee entitlements on their first inspection compared to employers 
who were only inspected once. 
 
FIGURE 3 HERE  
 
The next question is whether ESOs issue tickets more frequently when they detect ticketable 
violations on a re-inspection. Figure 3 shows us that while 41% of all re-inspected employers had 
a ticketable violation on subsequent inspection, only 28% of such offenders were issued a ticket. 
However, in Figure 3 the focus is on all inspections which does not differentiate between 
employers who only had ticketable violations on their first inspection and those who did not. We 
turn, therefore, to Figure 4, which presents only those 477 re-inspected employers who had a 
ticketable violation on their first inspection. 
 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
Among the 27% of employers who were issued a ticket on their first inspection, 33% were found 
to have re-offended on the re-inspection, but only 19% of these employers were issued tickets. On 
the other hand, among the 73% of employers who had a ticketable violation but were not issued a 
ticket, 42% had violations on their re-inspection and of these 31% were issued tickets. These 
results suggest that receiving a ticket on a first inspection is indeed associated with less likelihood 
of employers having a ticketable violation on a re-inspection. This finding is consistent with the 
view that tickets have a specific deterrent effect and reduces the likelihood of a subsequent 
violation.  However, it is also peculiar that ESOs are less likely to issue a ticket to a re-offending 
employer who did not learn from their first ticket than they are to issue a ticket to a re-offending 
employer who was not ticketed in the first instance since all enforcement theories indicate that 
employers who re-offend after receiving a ticket should face escalating penalties, whereas clearly 
they do not. However, employers who enjoyed the benefit of ESO discretion and were not ticketed 
on their initial inspection — despite the presence of a ticketable violation — were treated more 
harshly when they were found to have re-offended on re-inspection, a finding  consistent with the 
recommendations of the various enforcement theories discussed. 
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H. Predicting when tickets are issued 
To further reveal how different criteria are related to the issuance of tickets in workplace 
inspections, a logistic regression model is used to examine whether or not an inspection where a 
ticketable violation is detected and recorded is likely to yield a ticket based on the following 
criteria: company size, industry, type of inspection, entitlement amount, number of field visits, 
type of audit completed, and fiscal year (see Table 4). The merit of applying this type of model is 
that it determines the independent effect of each of these characteristics and their relation to 
whether or not a ticket is issued. The results generally mirror the results from the bivariate analysis 
presented earlier. As observed previously, company size does not have a substantial effect. 
Companies that are associated with public or private service industries are slightly less likely to be 
ticketed compared to companies in the accommodation and food services industry. However, 
complementing the descriptive findings above, a model of this sort underscores the importance of 
inspection characteristics (i.e., inspection type, number of field visits etc.) in predicting when 
tickets will be issued. As total entitlement amounts increase, there is also an incremential increase 
in the likelihood of being issued a ticket. However, there is little difference between inspections 
with entitlement amounts of less than $300 and inspections where only non-monetary violations 
are assessed. Compared to regular inspections, tickets are more likely to be issued in expanded 
investigations. Similarly, the odds of being issued a ticket increase for each additional field visit 
by an ESO. For example, the odds of being issued a ticket when five or more field visits take place 
during an inspection are over nine times higher than when one or fewer field visits take place. 
Inspections where the employer completed a self-audit or the ESO completed a full audit are also 
more likely to yield a ticket compared to inspections where the ESO only conducts a test audit. 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
IV. Discussion 
Theoretical perspectives on the use of deterrence measures provide context for understanding these 
empirical results. First, these findings demonstrate that tickets are used far more frequently in 
workplace inspections than they are in the investigation of individual complaints; they thus provide 
a more nuanced picture of the use of deterrence measures in Ontario than was possible in our 
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previous study of deterrence writ large. That said, the prevalence of tickets, at least when measured 
against detected and recorded ticketable violations, is low — fewer than one in ten. As a result, 
most employers can expect that, even if they are inspected and a violation is detected, the most 
likely consequence is that they will be required to correct the violation, either by paying what they 
owe in the case of monetary violations or by complying in the future with record keeping and other 
similar obligations. From a deterrence perspective, the prevalence of ticketing on inspections is 
still exceedingly low. 
Our results also reveal some more specific patterns in the use of tickets. Detected monetary 
violations are more likely to be ticketed than non-monetary violations and, among monetary 
violations, overtime pay, minimum wage, and public holiday pay violations are most likely to 
result in tickets. Employers with multiple violations, particularly if there are both monetary and 
non-monetary violations, are more likely to be ticketed than employers with a single detected 
violation and, where there is a monetary violation, the likelihood of being ticketed increases with 
the amount owed. All of these findings are consistent with the deterrence theory perspective that 
the greater the number and seriousness of violations, the harsher treatment they should receive. 
However, there is a serious question as to whether ticketing, no matter its frequency, achieves 
a deterrent effect. To our knowledge, there has been no previous research into the deterrent effect 
of tickets in the literature on ES; however, the issue has received more attention in the context of 
occupational health and safety regulation. In a study of workplace health and safety (WHS) 
enforcement in Australia, Bluff and Johnstone (2003) discussed issues arising out of the use of 
‘infringement notices’ (equivalent to tickets).   They found that such notices may be appropriately 
used to deal with minor offences particularly if unwitting. But they raised a concern that notices 
might turn offences into ‘purchasable commodities’ that have little deterrent effect (Bluff and 
Johnstone, 2003: 341-42). 
In principle, whether or not notices or tickets have a deterrent effect is an empirical question, 
but one on which there has been limited research. Gunningham et al. (1998: 338-339) interviewed 
Australian policy-makers, inspectors, industry partners, and recipients of infringement notices, and 
found that most respondents believed that despite a short-term positive effect on compliance, that 
improvements were more likely to be sustained if resources were provided for continuing 
enforcement. Subsequent research on WHS enforcement has tended to confirm that inspections 
with penalties have strong specific deterrent effects, but limited general deterrent effects. For 
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example, Gray and Scholz (1993) found while brief inspections without penalties had no injury-
reducing effects, those that included even small penalties significantly reduced injuries and lost 
work days. A recent systematic review of the WHS enforcement literature by Tompa et al. (2016) 
found strong evidence that inspections involving penalties are effective and moderate-to-limited 
evidence that those finding wrongdoing but absent penalties are ineffective. The authors concluded 
that this finding ‘reinforces the importance of regulators being out in the field identifying and 
citing/penalizing non-compliance’ (Tompa et al., 2016: 929).  More recently, Hardy and Howe 
(2017) found in the context of ES enforcement in Australia that targeted enforcement campaigns 
have a modest general deterrence ripple effect and that the size of the penalty is less important. 
Our study provides some evidence on the specific deterrent effects of inspections and ticketing 
in Ontario ES enforcement. Figure 3 shows that of the 573 employers inspected more than once, 
477 (83%) had ticketable violations on their first inspection, but only 41% of these employers had 
ticketable offences on their second. This decrease in the prevalence of ticketable violations on re-
inspection suggests that inspections reduce the likelihood that an employer will re-offend in the 
six to twelve-month period following the inspection, but it does not tell us about the relative 
deterrent effect of inspections with and without penalties. Figure 4 enables us to analyse these 
effects by differentiating between employers who were ticketed on the first inspection and those 
who were not. Among those employers who had ticketable violations but were not ticketed on their 
first inspection, 42% were found to have re-offended on re-inspection. By contrast, among 
employers who were ticketed on their first violation, only 33% were found to have re-offended on 
a re-inspection. These data suggest that inspections with tickets have a marginally greater deterrent 
effect than inspections without tickets. However, they also provide evidence that inspections 
without tickets, coupled with a warning that the employer may be re-inspected, also have a specific 
deterrent effect, supporting the view that proactive inspections of all kinds should be a prominent 
part of any enforcement strategy. 
When viewed from the perspective of responsive regulation and the enforcement pyramid, a 
relatively low rate of ticketing on first inspections is justified on the basis that employers with 
detected violations should be given the benefit of the doubt that their violations were inadvertent.  
However, that presumption should give way in the face of evidence to the contrary, such as the 
presence of multiple violations, particularly those involving large sums of money owing to 
employees. Our findings suggest that ESOs have incorporated that perspective in regard to 
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ticketing on first inspections. However, as this study and OHS studies demonstrate, such an 
approach comes at the cost of foregoing the greater specific deterrent effects that inspections with 
tickets produce. 
The pattern of ticketing on re-inspections is more problematic from the pyramid perspective. 
Employers with a ticketable violation on a re-inspection are not more likely to be ticketed than 
those who had a ticketable violation on their first inspection. However, when we narrowed the 
analysis to employers who had a ticketable violation on the first inspection and who re-offended 
on the second, we found that the enforcement pyramid seemed to apply in regard to employers 
who were not ticketed in the first instance, but that those employers who were ticketed on the first 
inspection faced a reduced likelihood of being ticketed for a repeat violation. 
Perhaps in an attempt to better address the problem of lax treatment of re-offending employers, 
Ontario conducted an enforcement blitz in 2016, targeting employers with prior ES violations. In 
announcing the blitz, the government declared that it was adopting a zero-tolerance policy, which 
presumably indicated that repeat violators would face a penalty. In practice, however, nothing of 
this sort happened. Of the 104 employers who were re-inspected in the context of the blitz, 77 were 
found to be in violation again. Yet only 15 NOCs and 27 tickets were issued (Ontario MOL, 2017; 
Mojtehedzadeh, 2017). Even assuming that no employer received multiple tickets or NOCs, the 
result is that only 55% of repeat offenders were subject to low-level deterrence measures. Thus, 
despite the promise of adherence to a strict enforcement pyramid in this blitz, it did not materialise. 
Finally, from the perspective of strategic enforcement, it is arguable that, as a general matter, the 
deterrence leg of the strategy is under-used. More specifically, although there is some evidence 
that at least one industry, accommodation and food services (likely to be a site of high levels of 
violations) is ticketed somewhat more frequently than other industries, the difference is small. As 
well, small employers, also known as a location of more frequent ES violations, are not more likely 
to receive tickets. While this practice might be justified in strategic enforcement if there was a 
targeted effort to engage entities at the top of the supply chain to secure compliance at the bottom, 
no initiatives of this sort are yet underway in Ontario. 
V. Conclusion 
In recent years, the Ontario government has modestly shifted its approach to ES enforcement 
toward greater use of proactive inspections with tickets when violations are detected. This shift is 
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likely to continue. In 2017 special advisors appointed to conduct the Changing Workplaces Review 
(2017) recommended allocating more resources to proactive enforcement, increasing the use of 
targeted inspections and expanded investigations and increasing penalties for tickets and NOCs. 
The government embraced the idea of strengthening enforcement and committed to hiring as many 
as 175 new ESOs by 2021, inspecting 1 in 10 Ontario workplaces annually, and better targeting 
enforcement resources on employers who violate the ESA (Government of Ontario, 2017). 
However, while it enacted legislation that would permit a flexible schedule of penalties for NOCs, 
the government did not increase the set fines for tickets (Fair Workplaces, Better Jobs Act, 2017). 
Our research broadly supports increased use of proactive inspections with low-level 
penalties. Of course, we recognise that proactive inspections and deterrence are only one leg of 
an effective enforcement strategy, but given the long history of compliance-based approaches 
that minimise the role of proactive enforcement and penalties, often in response to active 
resistance, our research provides empirical support for maintaining a healthy role for deterrence 
in the enforcement mix. 
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Table 1: Comparing the use of tickets and Notices of Contravention in workplace inspections and individual 
complaints 
  2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 
PART  I TICKETS         
Complaints   
  
Ticketable Violations  -- 11,751         10,196         -- 
Part I Tickets -- 121         186         -- 
% of Ticketable Violations with Tickets -- 1.0%         1.8%         -- 
Inspections   
  
Ticketable Violations  4,870         3,723         2,781         4,907        
Part I Tickets 298         348         259         450        
% of Ticketable Violations with Tickets 6.1%        9.3%        9.3%        9.2%       
     
NOTICES OF CONTRAVENTION         
Complaints     
Total Number of Violations  12,079       12,071       10,476       -- 
Notices of Contravention 60        79        68        -- 
% of Complaints with Notices of Contravention 0.5%       0.7%       0.6%       -- 
Inspections    
 
Total Number of Violations  4,958        3,786        2,849        4,676        
Notices of Contravention  42        20        34        35        
% of Inspections with Notices of Contravention 0.8%       0.5%       1.2%       0.7%  
 
Source: ESIS data 2012/13 to 2015/16 
Note: Data for complaints are not available for 2015/16 as complaints take longer to process than inspections. Data on tickets in 
complaints for 2012/13 are suppressed due to small counts. 
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Table 2: Prevalence of ticketable violations and the use of tickets in workplace inspections, by fiscal year 
  2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 Total 
Total Number of Inspections 2,349      1,902      1,747      2,548      8,546      
Number of Inspections with Ticketable Violations 1,674      1,297      989      1,621      5,581      
% of Inspections with Ticketable Violations  71.3%      68.2%      56.6%      63.6%      65.3%      
      
Number of Inspections with One or More Tickets Issued 259      280      207      330      1,076      
% of Inspections with Ticketable Violations with One or More Tickets Issued 15.5%      21.6%      20.9%      20.4%      19.3%      
 
Source: ESIS data 2012/13 to 2015/16 
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Table 3: Characteristics of workplace inspections with ticketable violations 
where tickets are issued, 2012/13 to 2015/16 (pooled) 
  
Ticket Not 
Issued 
Ticket 
Issued  
ES VIOLATION CHARACTERISTICS     
Type of Violations (Inspections with Multiple 
Violations)   
Two or More Non-Monetary Violations 93.3%   6.7% 
Two or More Monetary Violations  77.7% 22.3% 
Both Monetary and Non-Monetary Violations 68.2% 31.8% 
Total Entitlement Amount  
  
Median   $591 $1,576 
   
EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS     
Industry      
Accommodation and Food Services 77.7% 22.3% 
Manufacturing and Primary Industriesa 80.5% 19.5% 
Retail Trade 81.9% 18.1% 
Service Industries - primarily private-sectorb 83.3% 16.7% 
Service Industries - primarily public-sectorc 84.4% 15.6% 
Company Size      
1 to 5 employees 81.7% 18.3% 
6 to 10 employees 82.0% 18.0% 
11 to 19 employees 79.9% 20.1% 
20 to 49 employees 79.3% 20.7% 
50 or more employees  81.5% 18.5% 
   
INSPECTION CHARACTERISTICS     
Type of Inspection    
Expanded 75.1% 24.9% 
Targeted and THA Blitz 82.9% 17.1% 
Regular  81.7% 18.3% 
Others 83.3% 16.7% 
Number of Field Visits    
0 or 1 Visit 93.0%   7.0% 
2 Visits 81.8% 18.2% 
3 Visits 75.3% 24.7% 
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4 Visits 62.7% 37.3% 
5 + Visits 50.0% 50.0% 
Type of Audit Completed   
Test Audit  89.1% 10.9% 
Self Audit  73.4% 26.6% 
Full Audit  75.0% 25.0% 
No Audit  79.6% 20.4% 
 
Source: ESIS data 2012/13 to 2015/16 
Note: 
a Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, 
manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing 
b Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical 
services, management, and administrative and other support services 
c Industries include: include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public 
administration, information, culture, and recreation 
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Table 4: Logistic regression modelling the probability of a workplace 
inspection yielding a ticket, 2012/13 to 2015/16 (pooled) 
  B       
Odds 
Ratio 
Company Size   
1 to 5 employees (reference) 0.00            1.00            
6 to 10 employees -0.27            0.76            
11 to 19 employees -0.13            0.88            
20 to 49 employees -0.20            0.82            
50 or more employees -0.30            0.74            
Missing company size information -0.37            0.69            
Industry (based on the NAICS)   
Accommodation and Food Services (reference)  0.00            1.00            
Manufacturing and Primary Industriesa -0.10            0.91            
Retail Trade -0.16            0.85            
Service Industries - primarily private-sectorb -0.30            0.74            
Service Industries - primarily public-sectorc -0.39            0.68            
Type of Inspection    
Regular (reference) 0.00            1.00            
Expanded Investigation  0.36            1.43            
Targeted and THA Blitz 0.14            1.15            
Other 0.03            1.03            
Entitlement Amounts   
Less than $300 (reference) 0.00            1.00            
$300 to $999 0.77            2.17            
$1,000 to $1,999 1.12            3.07            
$2,000 to $9,999 1.44            4.24            
$10,000 or more 1.97            7.17            
Non-Monetary -0.07            0.93            
Number of Field Visits   
0 or 1 Visit (reference) 0.00            1.00            
2 Visits 1.00            2.71            
3 Visits 1.22            3.37            
4 Visits  1.83            6.24            
5 + Visits 2.24            9.38            
Type of Audit Completed   
Test Audit (reference) 0.00            1.00            
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Self Audit 0.26            1.29            
Full Audit 0.36            1.43            
No Audit 0.65            1.91            
Fiscal Year   
2012/13 (reference) 0.00            1.00            
2013/14 0.42            1.53            
2014/15 0.44            1.55            
2015/16 0.35            1.42            
 
Source: ESIS data 2012/13 to 2015/16 
Note: 
a Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, 
manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing 
b Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical 
services, management, and administrative and other support services 
c Industries include: include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public 
administration, information, culture, and recreation 
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Figure 1: Percentage of ticketable violations which result in tickets 
 
Source: ESIS data 2012/13 to 2015/16 
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Figure 2: Percentage and number of tickets issued, by violation (2012/13 to 2015/16, pooled)  
 
 
Source: ESIS data 2012/13 to 2015/16 
Note: 
When violations are detected and recorded in workplace inspections, they typically include multiple ticketable offences. Ticketable 
offences were categorized into the above monetary and non-monetary violations based on the ESA sections that were specified in the 
record. 
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Figure 3: The use of tickets in first inspections or re-inspections, all inspected employers 
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Figure 4: The use of tickets for repeat inspections, employers with ticketable violations in first inspection 
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1 Access to data from ESIS was acquired under a unique data-sharing agreement with the MOL. 
We are grateful to this Ministry and its staff for engaging in this agreement and for supporting 
the larger research partnership from which this article emanates. 
2 This analysis uses the government fiscal year, which runs from April 1st to March 31st. 
3 A smaller number of inspections are classified as 'other' inspections: these include re-
inspections or inspections of previous ES violators, inspections that result from an employer 
completing the MOL's online ‘compliance check’ (self-audit) tool, or those that are specifically 
prompted by other ESOs, regional and district managers, or the staff of the EPB. 
4 ESOs conducting inspections may not record every violation they detect. For example, an ESO 
may inspect a workplace and find that the employer has failed to post a mandatory poster. Rather 
than record this as a violation, the ESO may simply provide the employer with a poster, which is 
immediately posted, and continue the inspection. Thus, we stipulate that the violation must be 
both detected and recorded.  
5 The relatively low number of unpaid wage violations and the low use of tickets for these 
violations may be attributable to the fact that unpaid wages are not one of the 11 designated 
standards that ESOs are required to review in inspections; this is not the case, however, for 
vacation pay violations. 
6 This percentage may understate the actual frequency of repeat inspections as it is possible that 
an insufficient amount of time lapsed for repeat inspections to be undertaken among those 
employers inspected in 2015/16.   
                                                 
